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Factual relativism

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Factual relativism (also called epistemic relativism, epistemological relativism, alethic relativism, and cognitive relativism) is the philosophical belief that certain facts are not absolute but depend on the perspective from which they are being evaluated.[1] It is often invoked in scientific contexts, such as Einstein's theory of relativity, which shows that properties can depend on the observer's frame of reference.[2] This challenges the assumption that all facts are objective.[1] According to factual relativism, facts used to justify claims are subjective and relative.[3]

History and development

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Factual relativism is rooted in the idea that the standards for what counts as a rational belief can change depending on cultural or conceptual perspectives. This challenges the traditional view that there are objective, universal standards for determining what is true and rational.[2]

There are three main ideas behind factual relativism. The first is that the justification of beliefs depends on the context they are observed from. This challenges the idea of objectivity. The second is that there are many different perspectives and ways of thinking, some of which contradict each other. Lastly, factual relativism says that no perspective is superior to another.[2]

During the Scientific Revolution, Galileo and Cardinal Robert Bellarmine disagreed about how planets move. Each used a different system. A relativist would argue that there is no fact of the matter about which view is supported by the evidence because there are no standards as to what evidence is true. In contrast, an anti-relativist would say one theory is better supported by evidence than the other.[2]

Philosopher Thomas Kuhn influenced discussion of factual relativism with his idea of scientific paradigms. He argued that what scientists consider facts depends on the dominant paradigm they work within, which can shift during scientific revolutions.[2]

In anthropology, scholars like Peter Winch have explored how factual relativism plays out in non-Western cultures, such as the people, whose belief in witchcraft is seen as rational within the context of their culture. This shows how factual relativism can help explain the legitimacy of different standards based on cultural context. This sparked debates about whether it is possible to compare beliefs across cultures using a single standard of rationality.[2]

Viewpoints

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One perspective compares scientific knowledge to the mythology of other cultures, arguing that science is merely a societal set of myths based on societal assumptions. In Against Method, Paul Feyerabend writes, "The similarities between science and myth are indeed astonishing" and "First-world science is one science among many". But it is debated whether Feyerabend intended these statements to be taken entirely seriously, as they may have been a critique of the claimed objectivity of science rather than a full endorsement of the idea that science and myth are equally valid.[4]

The strong program in the sociology of science, in the words of founder David Bloor, argues that it is "impartial with respect to truth and falsity".[5] Elsewhere, Bloor and Barry Barnes have said "For the relativist [such as us] there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as distinct from merely locally accepted as such."[6] In France, Bruno Latour has claimed that "Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature's representation, not the consequence, we can never use the outcome—Nature—to explain how and why a controversy has been settled."[7]

Yves Winkin, a Belgian professor of communications, responded to a popular trial in which two witnesses gave contradicting testimony by telling the newspaper Le Soir that "There is no transcendent truth. [...] It is not surprising that these two people, representing two very different professional universes, should each set forth a different truth. Having said that, I think that, in this context of public responsibility, the commission can only proceed as it does."[8]

The philosopher of science Gérard Fourez wrote, "What one generally calls a fact is an interpretation of a situation that no one, at least for the moment, wants to call into question."[9]

British archaeologist Roger Anyon told The New York Times that "science is just one of many ways of knowing the world... The Zuni's world view is just as valid as the archeological viewpoint of what prehistory is about."[10]

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. Defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. Detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness."[11]

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Epistemic relativism

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Epistemic relativism has many similarities to factual relativism: both question the objectivity of truth. According to epistemic relativism, knowledge depends on context and what counts as rational knowledge depends on one's perspective. This challenges the idea of objective standards for evaluating knowledge, just as factual relativism challenges the existence of objective facts.[2] Critics such as Paul Boghossian argue that epistemic relativism can lead to epistemic incommensurability, where different knowledge systems are so different that they cannot be compared or evaluated.

The self-excepting fallacy

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A primary critique of factual relativism is the self-excepting fallacy, introduced by Maurice Mandelbaum in 1962. According to this critique, the relativist view is inconsistent because it requires the relativist to accept a universal claim about the nature of facts, even though relativism itself denies the possibility of universal truth. Because of this contradiction, few authors in the philosophy of science accept cognitive relativism.[12]

Philosophical perspectives on factual relativism

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Larry Laudan's book Science and Relativism outlines various viewpoints on factual relativism in the form of a dialogue,[13] presenting different perspectives on knowledge and how it relates to truth, objectivity, and cultural context.

Criticisms of cognitive relativism

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Cognitive relativism has been criticized by both analytic philosophers and scientists.[12][11] Critics argue that relativism's emphasis on knowledge's dependence on cultural and social contexts undermines the possibility of universal truth and objective knowledge. It can even be seen as a threat to scientific inquiry, as the scientific process depends on objective methods and standards of evidence.

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ a b Einheuser, Iris (2008-08-14), García-Carpintero, Manuel; Kölbel, Max (eds.), "Three Forms of Truth Relativism", Relative Truth, Oxford University Press, p. 0, ISBN 978-0-19-923495-0, retrieved 2025-04-05
  2. ^ a b c d e f g Baghramian, Maria; Carter, J. Adam (2025), Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.), "Relativism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2025 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2025-04-06
  3. ^ Iris Einheuser, "Varieties of Relativism: Indexical, Propositional and Factual", from the Logos conference on RELATIVIZING UTTERANCE TRUTH, Barcelona, 2005.
  4. ^ Feyerabend, Paul (1992). Against method (Repr ed.). London [u.a.]: Verso. p. 3. ISBN 9780860916468.
  5. ^ "PhilosophyScience2". Retrieved August 11, 2012.
  6. ^ Barnes, Barry; Bloor, David (1982). "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge". In Hollis, Martin; Lukes, Steven (eds.). Rationality and Relativism. MIT. pp. 27–28. ISBN 9780262580618.
  7. ^ Latour, Bruno (1987). Science in action : how to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 99. ISBN 9780674792913.
  8. ^ Sokal, Alan; Bricmont, Jean (1998). Fashionable nonsense : postmodern intellectuals' abuse of science. New York: Picador. p. 100. ISBN 9781466862401.
  9. ^ Fourez, Gérard (1992). La Construction des sciences, 2eme edition revue. Brussels:De Boeck Université.
  10. ^ Johnson, George. Indian Tribes' Creationists Thwart Archeologists, The New York Times, October 22, 1996
  11. ^ a b Baghramian, Maria; Carter, J. Adam (2018), "Relativism", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2019-10-08
  12. ^ a b Muncy, James A.; Fisk, Raymond P. (1987). "Cognitive Relativism and the Practice of Marketing Science". Journal of Marketing. 51 (1): 20–33. doi:10.2307/1251141. JSTOR 1251141.
  13. ^ Science and Relativism: Dialogues on the Philosophy of Science, ISBN 978-0-226-46949-2

References

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